

Beyond Efficiency: Value Frameworks for Public Administration

David H. Rosenbloom

American University, USA

Renmin University of China, China

Considering tradition and modernity in public administration encourages us to focus on the field's normative dimensions. Tradition teaches us that efficiency has not always been a dominant or default value for organizing public administration. Although efficiency rose to dominance in the 1930s, as with tradition, today it is contested by a plethora of competing public administrative values. Because there is no agreed upon framework for analyzing and organizing these values, this article offers a format for categorizing them and ordering their relationships to one another based on whether they are intrinsic, ancillary, or extrinsic to agency core missions.

Keywords: efficiency, Mission Intrinsic Values, Mission Ancillary Values, Mission Extrinsic Values, political system attributes, macro-policy, tradition, modernity

The theme of tradition and modernity encourages us to focus on “big questions” involving the fundamental values that inform our public administrative theory and practice. Values are central to public administration, even as we seek to improve it as a science. As Robert Dahl noted, “no matter what new categories, language, or methodologies spring forth, none escape the nagging BIG value dilemmas inherent within” public administrative thought; “the study of public administration must be founded on some clarification of ends” (Dahl, 1947, p. 3). Looking at tradition may call attention to values and practices that are now considered antiquated and misguided, perhaps even barbaric. However, it also reminds us that contemporary practices which we consider state-of-the-art may look ill-informed and backward to future generations. At the same time, concern with modernity calls on us to look forward to what that future might bring. This article first reviews values, past and present, that have guided public administration in the United States, next considers contemporary research on public administrative values, then seeks to integrate two extant frameworks for analyzing these values, and concludes that

because public administration is central to the overall quality of government and citizenship, it is important to define the field broadly and pay attention to values that go beyond efficiency or cost-effectiveness alone. Although the paper focuses on the United States, the frameworks discussed may have utility in values research elsewhere.

BEYOND EFFICIENCY

“Efficiency” has long been a central public administrative value. It has also long been problematic. For some countries, efficiency is embedded in natural law philosophical reasoning that prohibits the acquisition of more than one can reasonably use because one person's waste of a scarce natural resource can violate another's welfare (see Locke, 1680-1690/1994). In the U.S., efficiency has been frequently written into major administrative statutes reaching from the 1912 Lloyd-La Follette Act, if not earlier, to today's leading administrative reforms, such as the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. Along with economy and effectiveness, efficiency was among the three objectives of public administrative study put

This article was presented at the International Conference on Tradition and Modernity of State Governance in China, School of Public Administration and Policy, Renmin University of China on October 16, 2016. Address correspondence to the author at rbloom313@hotmail.com. View this article online at cpar.net

forth by Woodrow Wilson in his famous 1887 essay on “The Study of Administration” (Wilson, 2012). Yet, efficiency begs the bigger questions of public administration. As Marshall Dimock noted, “we do not want efficiency for its own sake” (Lee, 2015, p. 6). Dwight Waldo (1984, p. 193) asked “efficiency for what? Is not efficiency for efficiency’s sake meaningless?” Waldo later came to view the potential for efficiency to become a value in itself through goal displacement and broad social acceptance (2017, pp. 157-158). Even then, however, efficiency as “axiom number one” in the science of administration (Gulick, 1937, pp. 192-193) remains “hollow” (Durant and Rosenbloom, 2016, p. 5) and sometimes in conflict with other standard administrative values such as economy and effectiveness. At the very least, it should be combined with the latter as cost-effectiveness.

Still, even reframing efficiency in this way avoids the larger question posed by the juxtaposition of tradition and modernity: “What should the study and practice of public administration be?” Surely we are aware of tradeoffs between efficient administration and administration that encompasses a broad variety of public values. Narrowing public administration to management alone runs the same risk of bestowing irrelevancy to the overall design of public administration as a core aspect of a nation’s political, economic, and social systems as the orthodoxy of the 1930s.

TRADITION

In the United States, public administration tended to develop in relatively distinct periods in which dominant conceptions of what the public service is or should be emerged. Herbert Kaufman (1956) viewed these periods as being cyclically identified by executive leadership, representation, and politically neutral competence. The cycle seemed to work from the founding period in the 1780s and 1790s into the 1980s, which is surely a very good run for any public administrative theory. However, the emphasis on representation in the 1960s and 1970s should have been followed by an emphasis on politically neutral competence but instead was characterized by

executive leadership in the Reagan administration (1981-1989; see Lynn, 1985). Subsequently, the reinventing government and new public management movements appear to have shifted U.S. public administration to a largely different dynamic that features diminution of the distinctions between public and private administration.

Prestige of the Public Service and Elite Dominance

Shifting the analysis from focusing on the public service to the concept of what a public employee is or should be clarifies and refines Kaufman’s analysis. From 1789 to 1829, the federal service was essentially an arm of an elite class that was loosely tied together by socio-economic status and kinship (Aronson, 1964; see Rosenbloom, 2014a, pp. 2-7 for a brief overview). For President George Washington, elite domination was not an end in itself but rather a means of bestowing greater prestige on the fledgling federal service. He viewed “fitness of character” as the “primary object” in making appointments (Rosenbloom 2014a, p. 33). Character and ability tended to coincide in an age of inexperienced and unspecialized public administration, and little emphasis was placed on technical competence per se. Today, at least in the United States, we do not generally think of building and maintaining prestige in civil services as a major public administrative value. But why not? As late as the 1930s-1950s, major public administration scholars considered it important (White, 1932; Janowitz and Wright, 1956). Perhaps prestige, as might be generated by a public administration academy similar to its military equivalents such as West Point and the Naval Academy, would independently contribute to greater trust in public administration, which was a main concern of “reinvention” (Gore, 1993).

Public Administration as Representation and Partisanship

The elite period was followed by emphasizing representation and defining the federal service as an extension of the political party holding the presidency. In practice, this meant federal employees would be hired and fired based on partisanship rather than fitness of character or elite socio-economic status. In

an age in which “the duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance,” President Andrew Jackson rationalized change in terms of representativeness (Rosenbloom, 2014a, p. 44). Again, expertise or “talents” were considered of secondary importance. Jackson maintained that “the road to office” should be open “alike to the rich and poor, the farmer and the printer” while bearing in mind that “moral qualities should be made superior to that of talents” (Rosenbloom, 2014a, p. 48).

Jackson’s language comports with some aspects of contemporary representative bureaucracy theory. For instance, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 calls for a federal service demographically “reflective of the Nation’s diversity” (PL 95-454, sect. 3 [1]). In practice, however, appointments and dismissals of federal employees were based on partisanship and party and government activity became blended in what has become known as the “spoils system” (Rosenbloom, 2014a, Chapter 3).

The Jacksonian approach went a long way toward integrating federal administration into the political system by making it politically representative of a majority of the electorate. However, politically appointed federal employees tended to have a short-term outlook and corruption was rife (Rosenbloom, 2014a, pp. 48-53). Additionally, as administrative activities became more complex, greater competence was required to perform them. Enter the civil service reform movement of the 1870s-1890s.

Public Administration and Political Leadership Change

The reformers sought to replace political appointments with administrative staffing based on a merit system featuring open competitive examinations as the basis for selecting federal employees. They couched their advocacy for nonpartisan, merit-oriented federal personnel administration in terms of efficiency and morality. For instance, Carl Schurz, one of the reform leaders, argued that “there are certain propositions so self-evident and so easily understood that it

would appear like discourtesy to argue them before persons of intelligence. Such a one it is, that as the functions of government grow in extent, importance and complexity, the necessity grows of their being administered not only with honesty, but also with trained ability and knowledge” (Rosenbloom, 2014a, p. 59). George William Curtis, another leading reformer, contended that with patronage hiring and dismissal and its attendant corruption, “the moral tone of the country is debased.” As another reformer, Charles Bonaparte, argued, “to promise or confer public office as a bait or reward for personal or party service is always and everywhere immoral” (quoted in Rosenbloom, 2014a, p. 60). Historian of the federal service Paul P. Van Riper found that references to morality outnumbered those to efficiency by a ratio of 2:1 in a major portion of the reform literature (1958, p. 86n).

Although efficiency and morality were undoubtedly major objectives of the reformers, their larger goal was a change in the nation’s leadership class. This was candidly made clear by Schurz in declaring that “the question whether the Departments at Washington are managed well or badly is, in proportion to the whole problem, an insignificant question” (quoted in Rosenbloom, 2014a, p. 59). For the reformers, the “whole problem” was that the spoils system prevented men like themselves who were well educated, middle-class, and largely Anglo and Northern European Protestant-Americans, from assuming their role as the “natural leaders” of the nation. In the words of Dorman Eaton, who wrote the draft of the Civil Service Act of 1883:

We have seen a class of politicians become powerful in high places, who have not taken (and who by nature are not qualified to take) any large part in the social and educational life of the people. Politics have tended more and more to become a trade or separate occupation. High character and capacity have become disassociated from public life in the popular mind (Rosenbloom, 2014a, pp. 59-60).

Given this larger political agenda, it is ironic that the reformers have been credited with creating the now-famous “politics-administration” dichotomy by seeking to base “the business part of the government

...carried on in a sound businesslike manner” on partisan political interests (Rosenbloom 2014a, p. 60). In time, this became the ethic of “politically neutral competence” in service of the rule of law and public interest.

Public Administration as an Extension of the Presidency

The civil service reform movement was followed by the progressive (1890-1924) and scientific management (1911-1930s and beyond) movements. Together, these three movements formed the basis of the public administration “orthodoxy” which reached its pinnacle of influence with the formation of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (PCAM) and the release of its report in 1937 (often called the “Brownlow” Committee Report after the committee’s chair, Louis Brownlow). The PCAM continued to advocate for efficiency as a primary public administrative value and the merit system as a means of achieving it. However, it went well beyond the civil service reformers in seeking reorganization not just of the personnel system but of the entire federal administrative establishment. Its chief administrative value was unity of command in the form of greater and consolidated presidential power over the bureaucracy. Viewing the president as “the one and only national officer representative of the entire Nation,” the PCAM’s recommendations for reorganization sought to make the “chief executive” the “center of energy, direction and administrative management” (PCAM, 1937, pp. 1, 3). In the PCAM’s (1937, p. 53) view, “strong executive leadership is essential to democratic government today.” If its proposals were adopted, federal employees would serve the president by supporting and implementing his policy agenda. The federal service itself in turn would become an extension of the presidency.

In the U.S. constitutional separation of powers system, it is not surprising that the PCAM’s legislative proposal was denounced in Congress as “the dictator bill” for, as constitutional scholar John Rohr contended, “at the heart of the [PCAM’s] doctrine is a fundamental error that transforms the president from chief executive officer into sole executive

officer” (Rosenbloom, 2000, p. 18; Rohr, 1986, p. 139). Equally unsurprising, almost as soon as the nation was seeking normalcy after the depression and New Deal of the 1930s and the end of World War II in 1945, Congress responded to the “administrative presidency” with a coherent package of legislation in 1946 to make federal administration more legislative-centered (Rosenbloom, 2000). Henceforth, political scientists could debate whether the federal bureaucracy was dominated by the president or Congress, but contrary to the PCAM’s vision, it would be difficult to view federal employees as simply extensions of the presidency for policy formulation and implementation (Wood and Waterman, 1994). According to E. Pendleton Herring (1936), federal employees were already deeply engaged in policymaking in response to a variety of political forces, including interest group pressures and efforts to define the public interest as relevant to broad delegations of legislative authority from Congress. In his famous article on “Power and Administration,” Norton Long (1949) convincingly described how political power rather than authority flowing from the president is the “lifeblood” of federal administration.

Heterodoxy: Public Administration as Many Things

So what was a federal employee after 1946? No longer a prestigious arm of a governing elite, an adjunct of the president’s political party, an instrument of political leadership change, or an extension of the president’s administration. There were several answers—a representative of the public at large, a social group or interest group, a self-interest seeking, slacking budget maximizer, participant in an iron triangle or policy or issue network, good person trapped in a bad system, an implementer of the Constitution, or just a plain “bureaucrat.” Until the reinventing government movement as embodied in the federal National Performance Review changed the discussion in 1993, U.S. public administration was characterized by heterodoxy. Subsequently, performance—“a government that works better and costs less”—whether steering or rowing, became a more prominent public administrative value and federal employees and agencies were increasingly evaluated accordingly

(Gore, 1993).

Looking back on U.S. administrative tradition, we see first that efficiency was not always priority number one. The prestige of the federal service initially held that position. Then partisan and social representativeness (at least, within the social norms of the time) became dominant. Next, administrative reforms were used as a vehicle not so much for efficiency as for bringing about change in the nation's political leadership. The PCAM sought to strengthen the presidency beyond its earlier bounds by making the president sole executive officer, as Rohr observed. Congress had other ideas, and federal administration and administrators fell under its "joint custody" with the president. (Based on constitutional tort law and other judicial involvement in public administration, one could reasonably conclude that tri-partite custody is more apt [Rosenbloom, O'Leary, and Chanin 2010].) Today, performance is a key value. Going beyond Kaufman's framework, then, we see that traditional values attached to federal employment were prestige, social and political representativeness, nonpartisanship, presidential agency, congressional agency, and high performance. As Dahl observed in 1947, context is complicated and sometimes these values coincided with efficiency, and other times not. Note that the neither the word efficiency nor efficient appears in the original text of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, which was framed as the basic regulatory law of federal administration.

Even this brief review of U.S. public administrative tradition readily shows that efficiency has not always been and need not be the primary public administrative value. If today represents modernity, then we have a plethora of public values that are encompassed by public administration and it will be beneficial to develop standardized frameworks for analyzing them.

CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC VALUES RESEARCH

Public values have always been embedded in public administration. They were central to the civil service reform, progressive, and scientific management movements as well as to the orthodoxy of the 1930s

and the New Public Administration of the 1960s-1970s (Marini, 1971), they continue to inform waning attention to new public management, and are central to the current "performance movement" (Radin, 2006). Contemporary research on them can perhaps be traced to Torben Beck Jørgensen and Barry Bozeman's broad, somewhat catchall 2007 article on "Public Values: An Inventory."

Based on a review of 230 studies in the U.S., U.K., and Scandinavian countries, Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman identified 72 values and sought to categorize them based on their association with the "public sector's contribution to society," "transformation of interests into decisions," "relationships between public administration and politicians," "relationship between public administration and its environment," "interorganizational aspects of public administration," "association with the behavior of public sector employees," "associated with the relationship between public administration and citizens." Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman address the primacy and hierarchy of values, as well as whether they are associated with the government or nongovernmental entities. However, their research design does not enable identification of those values that are mandatory for public administrators, aspirational, intrinsic or extrinsic to the enterprise of public administration, or actually pursued in administrative practice.

Those steeped in the literature from which the values are drawn, will of course, not be surprised by Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman's list. All are familiar and many present well-known acute definitional and operational ambiguities. For instance, one would be hard pressed to find standard definitions or operational requirements for "accountability," "businesslike approach," "common good", "equity," "justice," "moral standards," "professionalism," "public interest," "reasonableness," "voice of the future," and "will of the people" (2007, pp. 377-378). This being the case, Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman call for further research to sort out values and make "sense of their relationships," especially in terms of "hierarchy and distinguishing prime values from instrumental values"(2007, p. 377).

As useful as a broad pass at the problem of understanding public values which Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman's approach may be, it has the major limitation of being "plucked" (2007, p. 358) out of public administrative literature rather than grounded in administrative practice or law, or for that matter, citizens' or the public's own identification of "public values." Zeger van der Wal (2008) improves on the Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman approach by narrowing the range of values analyzed and grounding his study of "value solidity" in the "organizational values of government and business" in surveys of practitioners in each sector. His rank ordered list for the public sector is:

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. <i>Incorruptibility</i> | 11. <i>Serviceability</i> |
| 2. <i>Accountability</i> | 12. <i>Efficiency</i> |
| 3. <i>Honesty</i> | 13. <i>Collegiality</i> |
| 4. <i>Lawfulness</i> | 14. <i>Responsiveness</i> |
| 5. <i>Reliability</i> | 15. <i>Innovativeness</i> |
| 6. <i>Transparency</i> | 16. <i>Social justice</i> |
| 7. <i>Impartiality</i> | 17. <i>Obedience</i> |
| 8. <i>Expertise</i> | 18. <i>Self-fulfillment</i> |
| 9. <i>Effectiveness</i> | 19. <i>Sustainability</i> |
| 10. <i>Dedication</i> | 20. <i>Profitability</i> |

(van der Wal 2008, p. 70).

Several of these values overlap those listed by Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman and, following Yair Zalmanovich's urging, can be folded into the familiar framework for viewing public administration as based on managerial, political/policy, and legal perspectives (Zalmanovich, 2014; Rosenbloom, 1983; 2013). Honesty, reliability, expertise, effectiveness, dedication, serviceability, efficiency, collegiality, innovativeness, (hierarchical) obedience, and self-fulfillment are primarily in the management domain. Accountability, transparency, responsiveness, social justice, and sustainability, are more clearly associated with politics/policy, and lawfulness, incorruptibility, and impartiality largely fall into the legal category. At least for the present, as Zalmanovich (2014) argues, sticking with the management, politics/policy, and law lenses limits the tendency of public administration scholarship continually "to reinvent the

wheel" by offering new, and sometimes theoretically, institutionally, and empirically untethered frameworks and putative paradigms that offer greater complexity but not necessarily better understanding.

As with Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman, van der Wal considerably moves the analysis of public values forward. Still missing, however, is the parsimony of grounding public values in the uncontestable base of public law. Even when so grounded, they may be ambiguous, contradictory, and lacking a hierarchical ordering. However, once public values are embodied in law, political systems, rather than public administration scholars and other researchers, can seek to do the fine tuning, sorting out, and ranking. In regimes with a high degree of legitimacy, whether democratic or otherwise, law is to some extent representative of Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman's "will of the people" (2007, p. 378) and courts and other governmental institutions may be useful in resolving inevitable conflicts among legal provisions.

A useful next step in framing public values, whether managerial, political/policy, or legal, might be to distinguish between those that are intrinsic or ancillary to agencies' core missions and those that are mission extrinsic (see Baehler, Liu, and Rosenbloom, 2014). The latter category—mission extrinsic—can be subdivided into values that support political system characteristics and those that promote public policy objectives. Although lines are sometimes blurred, some definitions may add clarity:

- Core mission values are the values that underlie the reasons or objectives for which an agency or the programs it administers were created. Promoting these values is the agency's reason for being. For instance, environmental sustainability is a core mission value for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; transparency is a core mission value of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (Baehler, Liu, and Rosenbloom, 2014; Rosenbloom, 2014b).
- Ancillary values are related to factors that facilitate the agency's successful pursuit of its core mission

values. For example, these include recruiting and retaining qualified staff in sufficient numbers and securing adequate budgets, space, equipment, and technology. Although largely overhead, these values can involve important matters of public policy, such as having socially diverse workforces (Rosenbloom, 2014b).

• Mission extrinsic public values have the following characteristics:

1. They do not support, or are only weakly related to, the central purposes, core activities, or *raison d'être* of agencies and their programs

2. They are unrelated to the agency's specialized competencies and technologies

3. They promote preferences that are extraneous to organizational missions and may even impede them

4. They are often imposed across all agencies in one-size-fits-all fashion that is not strategically tailored to individual missions

5. They are not necessarily supported by agency leaders and personnel

6. Their implementation is a means of leveraging the size, scope, authority, and resources of public agencies to promote the development or maintenance of political system attributes and macro-policy objectives.

Some examples may help clarify these definitions. Core mission values are typically identified in agency strategic plans and performance plans and reports. For instance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines its mission as reducing “environmental risk” (United States Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.), and the U.S. Department of Labor states its as “To foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners, job seekers, and retirees of the United States; improve working conditions; advance opportunities for profitable employment; and assure work-related benefits and rights.” (United State Department of Labor, n.d.) Ancillary public values guide the procurement and use of agency resources in achieving its core mission. For example, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management identifies training and motivating federal “employees to achieve their

greatest potential; and to constantly promote an inclusive work force defined by diverse perspectives” as public values that promote its core mission of serving its stakeholders (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, n.d.). For most agencies, freedom of information is a mission extrinsic public value that supports the political system attribute of transparency. Similarly, for most, reducing their carbon footprint is a mission extrinsic public value that supports the public policy objective of environmental sustainability. Of course, public administration does not come in neat packages of core, ancillary, and mission extrinsic public values and some values that are ancillary or extrinsic to most agencies will be core for others. Thus, workforce diversity is core mission, as well as presumably ancillary for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and as noted above, transparency and sustainability are a core mission public values for the National Archives and Records Administration and Environmental Protection Agency but mission extrinsic for most other agencies.

Mission extrinsic public values may be broadly imposed on or sought by public agencies because they are important contributors to the quality of government and the achievement of public policy objectives. For example, in the U.S., mission extrinsic public values promote the governmental attributes of openness and fairness in administrative procedures, privacy, equal protection, whistleblower and other rights, constitutional tort liability, vibrant federalism, reduction of regulatory burdens, and partisan political neutrality. In terms of public policy objectives, they include support for environmental justice and sustainability (recycling, energy and waste reduction) and strong and viable families, small businesses, and small governments (Baehler, Liu, and Rosenbloom 2014; Rosenbloom 2014b).

Because they are extraneous to the achievement of agencies' core missions, mission extrinsic public values can present special management challenges. The staff who are devoted to mission extrinsic activities do not directly contribute to an agency's core purposes and it may be difficult to integrate them into its culture and overall workforce. The

resources allotted to mission extrinsic requirements may be viewed as better assigned to more important and pressing agency concerns or even wasted. As one freedom of information official noted, “We all struggle with insufficient funds, insufficient staff, and too many requests to handle in a timely fashion. The people who run the daily mission programs in the agencies find it hard to devote time to FOIA [freedom of information]” (Foerstel, 1999, p. 94). In today’s performance-oriented U.S. federal administration, any deflection or distraction from an agency’s core mission results can be politically costly in terms of legislative support and, ultimately, funding.

Although mission extrinsic public values can be considered diversions from agencies’ core missions, it is possible to include them in strategic and performance planning. For instance, a comprehensive study of the strategic and performance plans of 24 U.S. federal agencies from 2001-2015 found that 16 agencies ignored the mission extrinsic public values of transparency, open government, collaboration, and participation entirely whereas eight provided some measure of attention to them (Piotrowski et al., 2016). As with performance measurement generally, the difficulty of developing and applying measures to mission extrinsic activity varies. In some cases, such as freedom of information, standard measures (timeliness, compliance, litigation reduction, litigation success) exist. For other activities, they may be difficult to design.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Apart from the effect of the budget at the provincial The theme of tradition and modernity reminds us that future generations may view today’s administrative practices much differently than we do. It would be extraordinarily pessimistic to believe that contemporary public administration cannot be improved, that it is the best that humans can do—or to think that we cannot play a role in making it better. When Herbert Simon (1947) urged us to distinguish between facts and values in developing a pure science of public administration, he did not contend that values were irrelevant. As Dahl (1947) explained, values are

inescapable in public administration. Simon himself identified efficiency as the criterion for administrative rationality: “It is not asserted here that the criterion of efficiency always does dominate” administrators and decisions “but rather that if they were rational it would” (Simon 1965, p. 182). In practice, though, there are other public administrative criteria and tradeoffs among them as the work on public values by Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007) and van der Wal (2008) illustrate.

Perhaps our greatest risk today as we consider how future generations might view our work is to become too narrow. Redefining or reducing the study of public administration to public management alone runs this risk. In order to build toward a better future, public administration must be inclusive of a wide range of public values, work toward ordering them into frameworks, and gain a better understanding of how they apply in and to different contexts. To recast an earlier thought, “Have an Administrative Rx? Don’t Forget the Public Values!” (Rosenbloom, 1993).

REFERENCES

- Aronson, S. 1964. *Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Baehler, K, C. Liu, and D. Rosenbloom. 2014. “Mission-Extrinsic Public Values as an Extension of Regime Values: Examples from the United States and the People’s Republic of China.” *Administration & Society* 46:199-219.
- Beck Jørgensen, T. and B. Bozeman, 2007. “Public Values: An Inventory.” *Administration & Society* 39:354-381.
- Civil Service Reform Act. 1978. PL 95-454.
- Dahl, R. 1947. “The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems,” *Public Administration Review* 7: 1-11.
- Durant, B. and D. Rosenbloom. 2016. “The Hollowing of American Public Administration.” *American Review of Public Administration* online version DOI: 10.1177/0275074015627218.
- Foerstel, H. 1999. *Freedom of Information and the Right to Know*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Gore, A. 1993. *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010. 2011. PL 111-352.
- Herring, E. 1936. *Public Administration and the Public Interest*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Janowitz, M. and D. Wright. 1956. "The Prestige of Public Employment: 1929 and 1954." *Public Administration Review* 16: 15-21.
- Kaufman, H. 1956. "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration." *American Political Science Review* 50:1057-1073.
- Lee, M. 2015. "Colluding to Create the American Society for Public Administration and the Consequent Collateral Damage." *Public Voices* 14:2-27.
- Lloyd-La Follette Act. 1912. 37 Stat. 555.
- Locke, J. 1994. *Two Treatises on Government*. New York: Legal Classics Library. (original work published in 1680-1690.)
- Long, N. 1949. "Power and Administration." *Public Administration Review* 9:257-264.
- Lynn, L. "The Reagan Administration and the Renitent Bureaucracy." In L. Salamon and M. Lund, eds. *The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America* (pp. 339-370). Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
- Marini, F. 1971. *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective*. Scranton, PA: Chandler.
- Piotrowski, S., D. Rosenbloom, S. Kang, and A. Ingrams. 2016. "Levels of Value Integration in Federal Agencies' Missions and Value Statements: Is Open Government a Performance Target of US Federal Agencies?" Presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, Philadelphia, PA (September 2).
- President's Committee on Administrative Management. 1937. *Report*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Radin, B. 2006. *Challenging the Performance Movement*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Rohr, J. 1986. *To Run a Constitution*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Rosenbloom, D. 1983. "Public Administrative Theory and the Separation of Powers." *Public Administration Review* 43: 219-227.
- Rosenbloom, D. 1993. "Have an Administrative Rx? Don't Forget the Politics!" *Public Administration Review* 53:503-507.
- Rosenbloom, D. 2000. *Building A Legislative-Centered Public Administration*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Rosenbloom, D. 2013. "Reflections on 'Public Administration and the Separation of Powers.'" *American Review of Public Administration* 43:382-397.
- Rosenbloom, D. 2014a. *Federal Service and the Constitution: The Development of the Public Employment Relationship*, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Rosenbloom, D. 2014b. "Attending to Mission-Extrinsic Public Values in Performance-Oriented Public Management: A View from the United States." In E. Bohne, J. Graham, and J. Raadschelders. eds., *Public Administration and the Modern State* (pp. 17-30). Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, UK.
- Rosenbloom, D., R. O'Leary, and J. Chanin. 2010. *Public Administration and Law*, 3rd ed. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis.
- Simon, H. 1947. *Administrative Behavior*. New York: Macmillan.
- Simon, H. 1965. *Administrative Behavior*, 2nd ed. New York: Free Press.
- United State Environmental Protection Agency, n.d., Our Mission and What We Do, retrieved from <https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do>
- United State Department of Labor, n.d., Our Mission, retrieved from <https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/mission>
- U.S. Office of Personnel Management, n.d., Our Mission, Role & History, retrieved from <https://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-mission-role-history/what-we-do/>
- Van der Wal, Z. 2008. *Value Solidity*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: VU University.
- Van Riper, P. 1958. *History of the United States Civil Service*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson and Co.
- Waldo, D. 1984. *The Administrative State*, 2nd ed.

Scranton, PA: Chandler.

- Waldo, D. 2017. "The Administrative State Revisited."
In J. Shafritz and A. Hyde, eds., *Classics of Public Administration*, 8th ed. (149-165). Boston: Cengage.
- White, L. 1932. *Further Contributions to the Prestige Value of Public Employment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wilson, W. 2012. "The Study of Administration. In J. Shafritz and A. Hyde, eds., *Classics of Public Administration*, 7th ed. (pp. 16-28). Boston, Wadsworth/Cengage. (Original work published in 1887).
- Wood, B. and R. Waterman. 1994. *Bureaucratic Dynamics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Zalmanovich, Y. 2014. "Don't Reinvent the Wheel: The Search for an Identity for Public Administration." *International Review of Public Administration* online: DOI:10.1177/0020852324533456.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David H. Rosenbloom is Chinese Thousand Talents Professor of Public Administration in the School of Public Administration at Renmin University of China and Distinguished Professor of Public Administration at American University (Washington, DC). He is best known for framing public administration in terms of managerial, political/policy, and legal perspectives and his research on public administration and law. In 2017, he was awarded the status of International Academic Master Lecturer at Renmin University of China.